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The safety enhancement of Oil&Gas offshore operations asks for improvements in the currently applied tools 
for risk estimation and evaluation. The present contribution is addressed at the development of a method for 
the dynamic evaluation of hydrocarbon leaks frequency from process equipment and piping. Specific 
indicators were scored in order to obtain modification factors aimed at tailorizing the frequency values. The 
method is suitable for the implementation in dynamic risk assessment, in order to provide an updating 
mechanisms that allow revising the accident frequency during the lifecycle of the facility. The potentialities of 
the method were tested with a demonstration case study. Results highlighted the importance of technical and 
managerial aspects in the estimation of accident likelihood and risk. 
1. Introduction 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) in the framework of Oil&Gas offshore operations is based on 
consolidated procedures. Nevertheless, the need of safety improvement asks for more advanced tools for 
hazard identification and risk evaluation (Paltrinieri et al., 2015a). Besides considering technical aspects (e.g., 
malfunctions and process upsets), operational errors, organizational aspects, such as lack of attention and 
motivation to the safety culture, may lead to risk increment in terms of likelihood of undesired failures (Ale et 
al., 2014). Not all those aspects may be investigated with conventional QRA techniques, which have also the 
disadvantage of being intrinsically static and failing to capture risk variations during the lifecycle of a plant or 
production site (Kalantarnia et al., 2009).  
In fact, due to ageing (e.g., erosion, corrosion, fatigue), defective maintenance associated to poor safety 
culture, the likelihood of an accident may increase with time, thus frequency values used in QRA might not be 
the same after many years of operation (Beerens et al., 2006).  
In the literature, there are several examples of frequency modification factors that “tailor” the leak frequency 
values to the facility under analysis (Pitblado et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the complexity - in terms of 
information required or evaluation time - or arbitrariness of the methods lead to difficulties in QRA 
implementation. Moreover, those methods are applied in order to modify an existing QRA at the beginning of 
operations and not in a dynamic perspective. 
In order to obtain time-varying risk evaluation, several methodologies were recently developed for Dynamic 
Risk Assessment (DRA) of industrial facilities (Paltrinieri et al., 2015b). DRA methods are aimed at evaluating 
the risk by updating initial failure frequencies of events as new information are made available during a 
specific operation. Therefore, the strength of DRA is connected to the use of case-specific data and to the 
availability of updating mechanisms that allow revising the accident frequency in time.  
In the present work, a novel method was developed obtaining time-varying leak frequency modification factors 
able to link the equipment and management quality features of the facility under examination to the 
worsening/betterment of the initial accidental frequency values. The modification factors may be used either to 
obtain a simplified evaluation of risk increment or decrement connected to a given process unit or to support 
the application of advanced DRA techniques by updating failure frequency data. The methodology is based on 
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the evaluation of technical, operational and organizational factors. The application to a simplified case study 
was undertaken in order to show potential benefits in the application of the methodology. 
2. Background 
Frequency modification factors are aimed at “tailorizing”, e.g., introducing a modification to the generic 
accident frequency (fb, the baseline frequency value). Those factors usually take into account the HSE 
management of the site of interest, maintenance policy, equipment working conditions, external severe 
environmental impacts, and other relevant issues, which could induce a decrement or an increment of fb, 
according to the present relationship: 
∏=
m
mb MFff
   (1) 
where f is the modified frequency value and MFm are the modification factors. Several methods are available 
in the technical and scientific literature for the determination of MFm, as summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Brief summary of frequency modification methods available in the literature 
Method Description Reference 
CCPS Based on arbitrary expert judgment evaluation (CCPS, 2000) 
API 581 
Based on the determination of equipment and management 
modification factors obtained from design data and site inspection 
(API, 2000) 
MANAGER 
Based on the determination of a management modification factor 
obtained from site inspection implicitly covering technical aspects 
(Pitblado et al., 1990) 
DNV 
Based on the scoring of safety barriers, obtaining frequency reduction 
factors and implicitly covering managerial aspects 
(Pitblado et al., 2011) 
 
The arbitrariness of the CCPS method lead to difficulties in QRA implementation (Pitblado et al., 2011). 
MANAGER and DNV methods are more complex and rigorous, but they individually focus only on managerial 
and technical aspects, respectively. Even if the integrated evaluation of technical and managerial aspects is 
foreseen by API 581 method, it is not suitable for application, since the penalties were never updated; hence it 
may results not conservative. Finally, none of the mentioned methods was designed in a dynamic perspective, 
in order to support a continuous update of accident frequency values for dynamic risk assessment. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Overview of the methodology 
In the present work, a methodology for the determination of leak frequency modification factors is presented. 
The method is aimed at determining modification factors considering technical and managerial aspects in a 
dynamic perspective, thus in order to be suitable for implementation in dynamic risk assessment. In particular, 
technical aspects are obtained from the improvement of API 581 method, while managerial aspects, both 
organizational and operational, are based on the concept of resilience (Woods, 2006). The hierarchical 
structure of the methodology is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Hierarchical structure of the methodology aimed at the determination of the leak frequency 
modification factor in TEC2O method. 
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The method is named “TEC2O”, since it considers technical, operational and organizational aspects in an 
integrated approach. As shown in Figure 1, the baseline frequency value (fb) is modified following Eq. (1) 
through a Technical Modification Factor (TMF) and a Management Modification Factor (MMF). TMF and MMF 
are obtained combining different scores, which in turn are the result of the monitoring of sound and 
quantitative indicators. The use of quantitative input data constitutes an advantage with respect to common 
literature methods based on subjective evaluations (see Table 1).  
Indicators are converted in scores which are based on arbitrary scale. Furthermore, in case a quantitative 
value of an indicator is not available, a qualitative score may be directly assigned. An important aspect is that 
the set of indicators proposed is changeable. It should be established in collaboration with the Company 
before applying the method. Finally, it is important to highlight that TEC2O must be applied to each piece of 
equipment of the plant under study, even though several indicators are related to the facility or the company. 
3.2 Technical modification Factor 
This factor aims at synthetically account for the lifecycle of the equipment, in order to penalize “old” units that 
may be more prone to result in leaks and failure due to ageing, erosion and/or corrosion phenomena. 
Moreover, external factors (environmental issues, seismic zone, harsh weather areas, etc.) are considered.  
TMF contributes only as a worsening element, since the failure likelihood of typical mechanical and electrical 
components or systems increases with time, with growing rate approaching (or in some cases extending) the 
end of design life. 
Figure 1 shows the complete structure of the TMF. It is divided into four parts, each of them taking into 
account a different technical aspect, monitored through indicators. TMF structure was the same as the API 
581 “equipment modification factors”. More details on the definitions of indicators are reported elsewhere 
(Landucci & Paltrinieri, 2015), some examples are provided in Figure 2. 
Each selected technical indicator is periodically monitored. Inspections are critical in this phase in order to 
capture possible mechanical deterioration of the components and/or to monitor the quality of the working 
environment. In this work, it is suggested to use all the technical indicators and the same weight for each of 
them. Clearly enough, in case an aspect is deemed not relevant by the Company, a null weight can be 
assigned to one or more indicators.  
On the basis of the indicators status, an average score is assigned to each of the four parts (St,j where j = 
1,..4), ranging from 1 to 6 (1 = good; 6 = bad). In this work, the score range was defined in accordance with 
other methods dedicated to dynamic risk assessment, such as the Risk Barometer (Paltrinieri and Hokstad, 
2015). 
The combination of the scores using weights (wti) leads to the calculation of the overall technical score ε: 

=
=
n
i
iit wtS
1
,ε
   (2) 
In the present work, and equal weight was assigned to each score (e.g., wti = 0.25). This can be modified by 
the Company. Finally, the technical score ε is converted into the TMF using the rules reported in Figure 2. 
 
INDICATORS
1.1.1.1 Age of the piece of equipment
1.2.1.3 Qualitative ageing status
1.2.2.1 Inspection features
1.3.1.1 Adequate corrosion allowance
2.1.1.1 Seismic zone classification
2.2.1.1 Maximum/ minimum environmental temp.
2.2.2.1 Severe waves, winds and storm?
2.3.1.1 Layout and spacing are adequate
2.3.2.2 Neglected routine, temporary repairs
3.1.1.1 Pipe/equipment complexity
3.2.1.1 Design according to internat. standards
3.3.1.1 Maximum design life
4.1.1.1 Foreseen shutdown per year
4.1.1.2 Unexpected shutdowns last year
4.2.1.1 Status of PSV and other safety barriers
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(
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ε
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10
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Figure 2: Schematization of the procedure for converting technical indicators into the technical modification 
factor (TMF).  
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3.3 Management modification Factor 
The evaluation of the management modification factor is based on the concept of resilience and follows the 
REWI (Resilience based Early Warning Indicators) methodology (Øien et al., 2010). Managerial aspects are 
related to definition of safety procedures, training and competencies of operators, safety culture, frequency of 
maintenance operations and communication at different levels of the organization. Those elements are strictly 
related to the likelihood of an accident/incident, but are difficult to be quantified and converted into a factor 
implemented in a QRA. In order to introduce a quantitative evaluation, the REWI method proposes the use of 
indicators which are quantitative parameters, so they can be monitored, modified and updated in time.  
According to the work of Øien et al. (2010), the MMF is divided into two main subfactors (see Figure 1): 
operational subfactor and organizational subfactor. Indicators are converted into scores according the scheme 
reported in Figure 3. More details on the definitions of indicators are reported elsewhere (Landucci and 
Paltrinieri, 2015). 
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Figure 3: Schematization of the procedure for converting indicators into modification factors for the 
management modification factor (MMF). 
The Company may change this procedure on the basis of the specific case under analysis. Nevertheless, in 
case an indicator is only subjected to qualitative evaluation in absence of more precise data at a given time, 
only the following three scores are applied: “Good” = 2, “Average” = 4 and “Bad” = 6. Hence, even in presence 
of a qualitative good situation, an intrinsic penalty is associated due to the fact that insufficient indicator 
monitoring was performed. The combination of the scores associated to each indicators using weights (wmj 
and wmk respectively for operational and organizational indicators) leads to the calculation of the operational 
(OP) and organizational (OR) scores as follows: 

=
=
m
j
jjop wmSOP
1
,
   (3) 

=
=
p
k
kkor wmSOR
1
,
   (4) 
In the present work, and equal weight was assigned to each indicator score (e.g., wmj = 1/m, wmk = 1/p; 
where “m” and “p” are the total number of operational and organizational indicators, respectively). The 
Company may agree to change the relative weights in order to stress a specific operational or organizational 
issue.  
Then, OP and OR are combined using the following relationship to calculate an overall management score µ: 
OROP )1( ψψμ −+=    (5) 
where Ψ = 0.5 in the present version. As in the case of the other weights (wm and wt), even Ψ may be 
changed according to the indication of the Company. Finally, the management score is converted into the 
MMF using the rules reported in Figure 3. 
It is possible to see that MMF may increase the loss of containment frequency, due to poor safety attention 
and insufficient preparedness of operators to emergency situations, but it may even reduce it (see Figure 3). 
In fact, in case training and procedures are updated, a proactive approach to the safety issues is maintained in 
all the lifecycle of the plant, the likelihood of accidents is reduced despite the ageing of the plant (penalized by 
the technical modification factor). 
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4. Definition of a simplified case study 
In order to exemplify the methodology application, a sample case study was defined. The analysis focused on 
a three-phase separator of an offshore platform. A corrosive/erosive service was considered, assuming also a 
relevant sand content in the raw gas stream flowing in the lines. The separator is located on a platform in a 
non seismic zone, with ambient temperature ranging from -10 to 50 °C. Possible severe storms may affect the 
area. The case study is aimed at determining the tailorized leak frequency (f) during the first 5 years of 
operations. A QRA study is available, in which the baseline frequency value fb was used.  
Beside the technical indicators and scores, the Company agreed to monitor the following management 
indicators: OP1 = Average no. of hours system training last 3 months; OP2 = No. of emergency preparedness 
exercises last three months; OR1 = No. of process and plant changes/modifications last month; OR2 = 
Amount of overtime worked. For the sake of simplicity, a schedule of random events were associated to the 
separator and to the facility as a whole. Those data were used as input for the evaluation of indicators and the 
quantification of the case study. 
Table 2:  Summary of the events considered for the analysis of the demonstration case study.  
Event 
Year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Worsening of inspection quality    X X 
Harsh meteorological conditions  X    
Temporary repairs made permanent, neglected housekeeping     X 
Wear of the mechanical components     X 
Unexpected shut down   X   
Neglected maintenance of protection barriers     X 
Turnover with inadequate training  X    
Insufficient emergency preparedness exercises   X  X 
Process plants relevant modifications   X X  
Increment of overtime worked (e.g. work is transferred among shifts)  X  X X 
5. Results and discussion 
On the basis of the rules described in Section 2, the relevant indicators were monitored considering the events 
defined in Table 2 and a score was assigned for each year of operations. The results are summarized in Table 
3. Due to insufficient maintenance policy and inspection program, a worsening of plant condition status was 
considered. Moreover, the increment of overtime due to unforeseen plant modifications after only 2 years of 
operations, led to worsening of managerial indicators. 
Table 3:  Summary of the indicators scores (ranging between 1 and 6; 1 = good and 6 = bad) assigned on the 
basis of the monitored indicators in the dynamic case study 
Score 
Year 
Score 
Year 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
TM 1 1 1 2 3 OP1 2 4 2 2 2 
U 1 2 1 1 3 OP2 2 2 4 2 4 
M 1 1 1 1 2 OR1 2 2 4 6 2 
P 1 1 4 1 2 OR2 2 4 2 4 6 
ε 1 1.3 1.8 1.3 2.5 µ 2 3 3 3.5 3.5 
 
The dynamic evaluation of the modification factors is summarized in Figure 4. As shown in Figure 4a, TMF 
can only be subjected to an increment during the lifecycle of the plant. Relevant increases are following the 
worsening of inspection and work environment quality, especially after 5 years of operation. Despite the 
technical indicators are worsening, the management indicators lead to low value of the MMF, which never 
exceed the unity for the considered case study. Hence, a proactive approach to the safety culture is deemed a 
critical issue for risk reduction, due to decrement of accident likelihood with respect to similar facilities. 
The two modification factors are combined according to the rule depicted in Figure 1, obtaining the resultant 
tailorized leak frequency (f). Figure 4c shows the normalized f value, with respect to the baseline frequency 
(e.g., the parameter f/fb). In the considered case, the accident likelihood was reduced by one order of 
magnitude, due to efficient management system. However, the technical aspects may play an important role in 
689
frequency increment. In fact, TMF contributes to a frequency increment of more than 20% with respect to the 
baseline situation due to the events associated to years 4 and 5. 
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Figure 4: Results of the dynamic case study: a) Technical modification factor; b) Management modification 
factor; c) modified frequency value (f) normalized with respect to the baseline frequency (fb) adopted in the 
QRA. 
6. Conclusions and future works 
Offshore O&G activities need innovative work organization in order to both create value and reduce the risks 
of a major accident through smarter, better and faster decision-making and execution. The present work was 
aimed at showing the potentialities in updating leak frequencies to support dynamic risk assessment. 
A specific methodology was developed in order to be suitable for the application through all the lifecycle of an 
installation under analysis, accounting for technical, operational, and organizational aspects. The analysis of 
the case study exemplified the application of the method. The method was proved to be a potentially suitable 
tool in the framework of offshore O&G context, since it may be used as a novel decision-making tool based on 
monitoring, promoting the involvement of personnel and management. 
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